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Abstract: In this paper, we examine a sampled-data Nash equilibrium strategy for a stochastic linear
quadratic (LQ) differential game, in which admissible strategies are assumed to be constant on the
interval between consecutive measurements. Our solution first involves transforming the problem
into a linear stochastic system with finite jumps. This allows us to obtain necessary and sufficient
conditions assuring the existence of a sampled-data Nash equilibrium strategy, extending earlier
results to a general context with more than two players. Furthermore, we provide a numerical
algorithm for calculating the feedback matrices of the Nash equilibrium strategies. Finally, we
illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm by two numerical examples. As both situations
highlight a stabilization effect, this confirms the efficiency of our approach.
Keywords: nash equilibria; stochastic LQ differential games; sampled-data controls; equilibrium
strategies; optimal trajectories
MSC: 91A23; 93E20; 49N10; 49N70
1. Introduction
Stochastic control problems governed by Itô’s differential equations have been the
subject of intensive research over the last decades. This generated a rich literature and
fundamental results such as the H2 and LQ robust sampled-data control problems under a
unified framework studied in [1,2], classes of uncertain sampled-data systems with random
jumping parameters characterized by finite state semi-Markov process analysed in [3], or
stochastic differential games investigated in [4–7].
Dynamical games have been used to solve many real life problems (see e.g., [8]). For
example, the concept of Nash equilibrium is very important for dynamical games, where
for controlled systems the closed-loop and open-loop equilibria strategies present special
interest. Various aspects of open-loop Nash equilibria are studied for a LQ differential
game in [9], other results being reported in [10–12]. In addiytion, in [13] applications to gas
network optimisation are studied via open-loop sampled-data Nash equilibrium strategy.
The framework in which state vector measurements for a class of differential games are
available only at discrete times was first studied in [14]. There, a two-player differential
game was considered, and necessary conditions for the sample data controls were obtained
using a backward translation method starting at the last time interval, and following the
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previous state measurements. This case has been extended to a stochastic framework
in [15], where the players have access to sample-data state information with sampling
interval. For other results dealing with closed-loop systems (see, e.g., [16]). Stochastic
dynamical games are an important, but more challenging framework. First introduced
in [17], stochastic LQ problems have been studied extensively (see, [18,19]).
In the present paper, we consider stochastic differential games governed by Itô’s
differential equation, with state multiplicative and control multiplicative white noise
perturbations. The original contributions of this work are the following. First, we analyze
the design of a Nash equilibrium strategy in a state feedback form in the class of piecewise
constant admissible strategies. It is assumed that the state measurements are available
only at some discrete times. The original problem is transformed into an equivalent one
which asks to find some existence conditions for a Nash equilibrium strategy in a state
feedback form for a LQ stochastic differential game described by a system of Itô differential
equations controlled by impulses. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a
Nash equilibrium strategy for the new LQ differential game are obtained based on methods
from [20,21]. The feedback matrices of the equilibrium strategies for the original dynamical
game are obtained from the general result using the structure of the matrix coefficients of
the system controlled by impulses. Another major contribution of this paper consists of the
numerical methods for computing the feedback matrices of the Nash equilibrium strategy.
To our knowledge, in the stochastic framework, there are few papers dealing with the
problem of sampled-data Nash equilibrium strategy in both open-loop and closed-loop
forms ([22,23]), the papers [13,14] mentioned before only considering the deterministic
framework. In that case, the problem of sampled-data Nash equilibrium strategy can be
transformed in a natural way into a problem stated in discrete-time framework. Such a
transformation is not possible when the dynamical system contains state multiplicative
and control multiplicative white noise perturbations. In [15], the stochastic character is due
only to the presence of the additive white noise perturbations. In that case, the approach is
not essentially different from the one used in the deterministic case.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the problem, introducing
the L-players Nash equilibria concept. In Section 2.2, we state an equivalent form of the
original problem and we introduce a system of matrix linear differential equations with
jumps and algebraic constraints which is involved in the derivation of the feedback matrices
of the equilibrium strategies. Then, in Section 2.3, we provide some necessary and sufficient
conditions which guarantee the existence of a piecewise constant Nash equilibrium strategy.
An algorithm implementing these developments is given in Section 3. The efficiency of the
proposed algorithm is demonstrated by two numerical examples illustrating the behavior
of the optimal trajectories generated by the equilibrium strategy. Section 4 is dedicated
to conclusions.
2. Problem Formulation
2.1. Model Description and Problem Setting
Consider the controlled system having the state space representation described by









x(t0) = x0, t ∈ [t0, t f ], (1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the state vector, L is a positive integer, uk(t) ∈ Rmk , k = 1, . . . , L are
control parameters, and {w(t)}t≥0 is a 1-dimensional standard Wiener process defined on
a probability space (Ω,F ,P).
In the controlled system there are L players (k = 1, 2, . . . , L) who change their behavior
through their control function uk(·), k = 1, . . . , L. The matrices of the system A, C ∈ Rn×n
and matrices of the players Bk, Dk ∈ Rn×mk , k = 1, . . . , L, are known. In the field of the
game theory, the controls uk(·) are called admissible strategies (or policies) for the players.
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The different classes of admissible strategies can be defined in various ways, depending on
the available information.
Each player aims to minimize its own cost function (performance criterion), and for
k = 1, . . . , L we have
Jk(t0, x0; u1, . . . , uL) =E









We make the following assumption regarding the weights matrices in (2):
H. Gk ≥ 0, Mk ≥ 0, Rkk > 0, and Rkl ≥ 0, with k, l = 1, . . . , L, and l 6= k.
Here we generalize Definition 2.1 given in [23].
Definition 1. The L-tuple of admissible strategies (ũ1(·), ũ2(·), . . . , ũL(·)) is said to achieve
a Nash equilibrium for the differential game described by the controlled system (1), the cost
function (2), and the class of the admissible strategies U = U1 × U2 × · · · × UL, if for all
uk(·) ∈ Uk, k = 1, . . . , L we have
Jk(t0, x0; ũ1, ũ2, . . . , ũL) ≤ Jk(t0, x0; ũ1, ũ2, . . . ., ũk−1, uk, ũk+1, . . . , ũL). (3)
In this paper we consider a special class of closed-loop admissible strategies in which
the states x(t) of the dynamical system are available for measurement at the discrete-times
0 ≤ t0 < t1 < . . . < tN−1 < tN = t f , and the set of admissible strategies consists of
piecewise constant stochastic processes of the form
uk(t) = Fk(j)x(tj), tj ≤ t < tj+1, j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, (4)
with Fk(j) ∈ Rmk×n are arbitrary matrices.
Our aim is to investigate the problem of designing a Nash equilibrium strategy in the
class of piecewise constant admissible strategies of type (4) (the closed-loop admissible
strategies), for a LQ differential game described by a dynamical system of type (1), under the
performance criteria (2). Moreover, we also present a method for the numerical computation
of the feedback gains of the equilibrium strategy.
We denote Ũ pc = Ũ pc1 × Ũ
pc
2 × . . .× Ũ
pc
L the set of the piecewise constant admissible
strategies of type (4).
2.2. The Equivalent Problem
Define vk : [t0, t f ] → Rmk by vk(t) = uk(j), tj ≤ t < tj+1, j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, where
uk(j) are arbitrary mk-dimensional random vectors with finite second moments. If x(t)
is the solution of system (1) determined by the piecewise constant inputs vk(·), we set
ξ(t) = (xT(t) vT1 (t) . . . v
T
L(t))
T ∈ Rn+m, m = ∑Lk=1 mk.
Direct calculations show that ξ(t) is the solution of the initial value problem (IVP)
associated to a linear stochastic system with finite jumps often called system controlled
by impulses:
dξ(t) = Aξ(t)dt + Cξ(t)dw(t), tj ≤ t < tj+1 (5a)




Bdkuk(j) , j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, (5b)
ξ(t0) = (xT0 0
T . . . 0T)T , (5c)




A B1 B2 · · · BL





C D1 D2 · · · DL





In 0nm1 0nm2 · · · 0nml
















where 0pq denotes the zero matrix of size p× q.
The performance criteria (2) becomes













for all uk = (uk(0), . . . , uk(N− 1)), uk(j) are mk-dimensional random vectorsFtj -measurable
such that
E[|uk(j)|2] < ∞.
Throughout the paper Ft denotes the σ-algebra generated by the random variables
w(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t. The matrices in (7) can be written as
Gk = diag(Gk 0) ∈ R(n+m)×(n+m)
Mk = diag(Mk 0) ∈ R(n+m)×(n+m) (8)
Rki(j) = (tj+1 − tj)Rki.
Let U sd = U sd1 ×U sd2 × · · · ×U sdL be the set of the inputs of the form of sampled data linear
state feedback, i.e., u = (u1, u2, . . . , uL) ∈ U sd if and only if uk = (uk(0), . . . , uk(N− 1)) with
uk(j) = Fk(j)ξ(tj), 0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1, (9)
where Fk(j) ∈ Rmk×(n+m) are arbitrary matrices and ξ(tj) are the values at the time instants
tj of the solution of the following IVP:
dξ(t) = Aξ(t)dt + Cξ(t)dw(t), tj < t ≤ tj+1 (10a)




BdkFk(j))ξ(tj) , j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, (10b)
ξ(t0) = ξ0 ∈ Rn+m. (10c)
Let Φk be a matrix valued sequence of the form
Φk = (Fk(0), Fk(1), . . . , Fk(N − 1)), (11)
where Fk(i) ∈ Rmk×(n+m) are arbitrary matrices. We consider the set
U sdΦ = {(Φ1, Φ2, . . . , ΦL) : Φk are arbitrary sequences defined as in (11)}. (12)
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Remark 1. By (9) and (10), there is a one to one correspondence between the sets U sd and U sdΦ .
Each uk from U sdk can be identified with the sequence Φk = (Φk(0), Φk(1), . . . , Φk(N − 1)) of its
feedback matrices.
Based on this remark we can rewrite the performance criterion (7) as:













for all (Φ1, Φ2, . . . , ΦL) ∈ U sdΦ .
Similarly to Definition 1, one can define a Nash equilibrium strategy for the LQ
differential game described by the controlled system (5), the performance criteria (13) and
the class of admissible strategies U sdΦ described by (12).
Definition 2. The L-tuple of admissible strategies (Φ̃1, Φ̃2, . . . , Φ̃L) is said to achieve a Nash
equilibrium for the differential game described by the controlled system (5), the cost function (13),
and the class of the admissible strategies U sdΦ , if for all (Φ1, Φ2, . . . , ΦL) ∈ U sdΦ , we have
Jk(t0, ξ0; Φ̃1, Φ̃2, . . . , Φ̃L) ≤ Jk(t0, ξ0; Φ̃1, Φ̃2, . . . ., Φ̃k−1, Φk, Φ̃k+1, . . . , Φ̃L). (14)
Remark 2.
(a) Based on the Remark 1 we may infer that if (Φ̃1, Φ̃2, . . . , Φ̃L) is an equilibrium strategy in
the sense of the Definition 2, then (ũ1, ũ2, . . . , ũL) given by (9) using the matrix components
of Φ̃k, provides an equilibrium strategy for the LQ differential game described by (5), (7) and
the family of admissible strategies U sd.
(b) Among the feedback matrices from (9) some have the form:
Fk(j) = (Fk(j) 0mkm), (15)
where Fk(j) ∈ Rmk×n. Hence, some admissible strategies (9) are of type (4). Hence, if the
feedback matrices of the Nash equilibrium strategy (Φ̃1, Φ̃2, . . . , Φ̃L) have the structure given
in (15), then the strategy of type (9) with these feedback matrices provide the Nash equilibrium
strategy for the LQ differential game described by (1), (2) and (4).
To obtain explicit formulae for the feedback matrices of a Nash equilibrium strategy of
type (9) (or, equivalently (11), (12)), we use the following system of matrix linear differential
equations (MLDEs) with jumps and algebraic constraints:
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−Ṗk(t) = AT Pk(t) + Pk(t)A + CT Pk(t)C + Mk, tj ≤ t < tj+1 (16a)




















Pk(t−N) = Gk, k = 1, . . . , L, (16d)
where we have denoted











while the superscript † denotes the generalized inverse of a matrix.
Remark 3. A solution of the terminal value problem (TVP) with algebraic constraints (16) is a
2L-uple of the form (P1(·), P2(·), . . . , PL(·); F1(·), F2(·), . . . , FL(·)) where, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ L,
Pk(·) is a solution of the TVP (16a), (16b), (16d) and Fk(j) ∈ Rmk×(n+m), 0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1. On
the interval [tN−1, tN ], Pk(·) is the solution of the TVP described by the perturbed Lyapunov-
type equation from (16a) and the terminal value given in (16d). On each interval [tj−1, tj),
j ≤ N − 1, the terminal value Pk(t−j ) of Pk(·) is computed via (16b) together with (17) and (18)
provided that (F1(j), F2(j), . . . , FL(j)) to be obtained as solution of (16c). So, the TVPs solved by
Pk(·), 1 ≤ k ≤ L are interconnected via (16c).
To facilitate the statement of the main result of this section, we rewrite (16c) in a
compact form as:
Πd(P1(tj), . . . , PL(tj), j)F(j) = −Γd(P1(tj), . . . , PL(tj)), (19)
where F(j) = (FT1 (j) FT2 (j) . . . FTL(j))T and the matrices Πd(P1(tj), . . . , PL(tj), j) and
Γd(P1(tj), . . . , PL(tj)) are obtained using the block components of (16c).
2.3. Sampled Data Nash Equilibrium Strategy
First we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium
strategy of type (9) for the LQ differential game given by the controlled system (5), the
performance criteria (7) and the set of the admissible strategies U sd. To this end we adapt
the argument used in the proof of ([22], Theorem 4).
We prove:
Theorem 1. Under the assumption H. the following are equivalent:
(i) the LQ differential game defined by the dynamical system controlled by impulses (5), the
performance criteria (7) and the class of the admissible strategies of type (9) has a Nash
equilibrium strategy
ũk(j) = F̃k(j)ξ(tj), 0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ L. (20)
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(ii) the TVP with constraints (16) has a solution (P̃1(·), P̃2(·), . . . , P̃L(·); F̃1(·), F̃2(·), . . . , F̃L(·))
defined on the whole interval [t0, t f ] and satisfying the conditions below for 0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1:
Πd(P̃1(tj), . . . , P̃L(tj), j)Πd(P̃1(tj), . . . , P̃L(tj), j)†Γd(P̃1(tj), . . . , P̃L(tj)) =
= Γd(P̃1(tj), . . . , P̃L(tj)). (21)
If condition (21) holds, then the feedback matrices of a Nash equilibrium strategy of type (9)
are the matrix components of the solution of the TVP (16) and are given by
(F̃T1 (j) F̃
T
2 (j) . . . F̃
T
L(j))
T = −Πd(P̃1(tj), . . . , P̃L(tj), j)†Γd(P̃1(tj), . . . , P̃L(tj)),
0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1. (22)
The minimal value of the cost of the k-th player is ξT0 P̃k(t
−
0 )ξ0.
Proof. From (14) and Remarks 1 and 2(a), one can see that a strategy of type (9) defines a
Nash equilibrium strategy for the linear differential game described by the controlled sys-
tem (5), the performance criteria (7) (or equivalently (13)) if and only if for each 1 ≤ k ≤ L
the optimal control problem described by the controlled system
dξ(t) = Aξ(t)dt + Cξ(t)dw(t), tj < t ≤ tj+1 (23a)
ξ(t+j ) = Ã[−k](j)ξ(tj) + Bdkuk(j), j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, (23b)
ξ(t0) = ξ0 ∈ Rn+m, (23c)
and the quadratic functional








E[ξT(tj)M̃[−k](j)ξ(tj) + uTk (j)Rkk(j)uk(j)], (24)
has an optimal control in a state feedback form. The controlled system (23) and the
performance criterion (24) are obtained substituting ũ`(j) = F̃`(j)ξ(tj), 1 ≤ k, ` ≤ L, ` 6= k
in (5) and (7), respectively. Ã[−k] and M̃[−k] are computed as in (17) and (18), respectively,
but with Fi(j) replaced by F̃i(j).
To obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the optimal control
in a linear state feedback form we employ the results proved in [20]. First, notice that in
the case of the optimal control problem (23)–(24), the TVP (16a), (16b), (16d) plays the role
of the TVP (19)–(23) from [20].
Using Theorem 3 in [20] in the case of the optimal control problem described by (23)
and (24) we deduce that the existence of the Nash equilibrium strategy of the form (9) for
the differential game described by the controlled system (5), the performance criteria (7)
(or its equivalent form (13)), is equivalent to the solvability of the TVP described by (16).
The feedback matrix F̃k(j) of the optimal control solves the equation:
(Rkk(j) + BTdk P̃k(tj)Bdk)F̃k(j) = −B
T
dk P̃k(tj)Ã[−k](j). (25)
Substituting the formulae of Ã[−k] in (25) we deduce that the feedback matrices of the
Nash equilibrium strategy solve an equation of the form (16c) written for F̃k(j) instead of
Fk(j). This equation may be written in the compact form:
Πd(P̃1(tj), . . . , P̃L(tj), j)F̃(j) = −Γd(P̃1(tj), . . . , P̃L(tj)), (26)
where F̃(j) = (F̃T1 (j) F̃T2 (j) . . . F̃TL(j))T .
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By Lemma 2.7 in [21] we deduce that the Equation (26) has a solution if and only if the
condition (21) holds. A solution of the Equation (26) is given by (22). The minimal value of
the cost for the k-th player is obtained from Theorem 1 in [20] applied in the case of the
optimal control problem described by (23), (24). Thus the proof is complete.
Remark 4. When the matrices Πd(P̃1(tj), . . . , P̃L(tj), j) are invertible, the conditions (21) are
satisfied automatically. In this case, the feedback matrices F̃k(j) of a Nash equilibrium strategy
of type (20) are obtained as the unique solution of the Equation (22), because in this case, the
generalized inverse of each matrix Πd(P̃1(tj), . . . , P̃L(tj), j), 0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1 is the usual inverse.
Combining (6) and (16c), we deduce that the matrices F̃k(j) provided by (22) have the
structure F̃k(j) = (F̃k(j) 0mkm). Hence, the Nash equilibrium strategy of the differential
game described by the dynamical system (5), the performance criteria (7) and the admissible
strategies of type (9) have the form
ũk(j) = (F̃k(j) 0mkm)ξ(tj) = F̃k(j)x(tj), 0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1.
Now we obtain the following Nash equilibrium strategy of the differential game.
Theorem 2. Assume that the conditions H. and (ii) in Theorem 1 are satisfied. Then, a Nash
equilibrium strategy in a state feedback form with sampled measurements of type (4) of the differential
game described by the dynamical system (1) and the performance criteria (2) are given by:
ũk(t) = F̃k(j)x(tj), tj ≤ t ≤ tj+1, 0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ L. (27)
The feedback matrices F̃k(j) from (27) are given by the first n columns of the matrices F̃k(j),
which are obtained as solutions of Equation (26). In (27), x(tj) are the values measured at the times
tj, 0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1, of the solution of the closed-loop system obtained when (27) is plugged into (1).







In the next section, we present an algorithm which allows the numerical computation
of the matrices F̃k(j) arising in (27) for an LQ differential game with two players.
3. Numerical Computations and the Algorithm
In what follows we assume that L = 2 and tj+1 − tj = h > 0.0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1.
We propose a numerical approach to compute the optimal strategies
ũk(j) = F̃k(j)x̃(tj), j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. (28)
The algorithm consists of two steps:
• We first compute the feedback matrices F̃k(j), j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, k = 1, 2 of the Nash
equilibrium strategy, based on the solution P̃1(·), P̃2(·):
− Ṗk(t) = AT Pk(t) + Pk(t)A + CT Pk(t)C + Mk, tj ≤ t < tj+1. (29)
STEP 1.A. We take Pk(t−N) = Gk, k = 1, 2, and compute
P̃k(tN−1) = eL
∗h[Gk] +Mk, k = 1, 2, where (30)


















L∗`[X] = X + hL∗[X] + h
2
2




with p ≥ 1 and q ≥ 1 sufficiently large.
For the operator L∗[X] we have
L∗[X] = ATX + XA + CTXC (32)
for all X = XT ∈ R(n+m1+m2)×(n+m1+m2).
The iterations L`[X] are computed from:
L∗`[X] = ATL∗(`−1)[X] + L∗(`−1)[X]A + CTL∗(`−1)[X]C (33)
for ` ≥ 1 with L0[X] = X where X = Pk(t−j+1) or X = Mk, respectively.
We compute the feedback matrices F̃k(N− 1) ∈ Rmk×n as solutions of the linear equation(
R11 + h−1P̃1,11(tN−1) h−1P̃1,12(tN−1)













STEP 1.B. We set
F̃k(N − 1) = (F̃k(N − 1) 0 0) ∈ Rmk×(n+m1+m2), k = 1, 2.
Next, we compute P̃k(t−N−1), k = 1, 2,:
P̃1(t−N−1) = (Ad + Bd2F̃2(N − 1))
T P̃1(tN−1)(Ad + Bd2F̃2(N − 1))
− (Ad + Bd2F̃2(N − 1))T P̃1(tN−1)Bd1(hR11 + BTd1P̃1(tN−1)Bd1)
−1
· BTd1P̃1(tN−1)(Ad + Bd2F̃2(N − 1)) + hF̃
T
2 (N − 1)R12F̃2(N − 1) (35)
and
P̃2(t−N−1) = (Ad + Bd1F̃1(N − 1))
T P̃2(tN−1)(Ad + Bd1F̃1(N − 1))
− (Ad + Bd1F̃1(N − 1))T P̃2(tN−1)Bd2(hR22 + BTd2P̃2(tN−1)Bd2)
−1
· BTd2P̃2(tN−1)(Ad + Bd1F̃1(N − 1)) + hF̃
T
1 (N − 1)R21F̃1(N − 1). (36)
STEP 2.A. Fix j such that j ≤ N − 2. Assuming that P̃k(t−j+1) have already been
computed for a j ≤ N − 2, k = 1, 2, we compute
P̃k(tj) = eL
∗h[P̃k(t−j+1)] +Mk, k = 1, 2, (37)
where Mk is computed as in (31).
We compute the feedback gains F̃k(j) ∈ Rmk×n as solution of the linear equation(
R11 + h−1P̃1,11(tj) h−1P̃1,12(tj)
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∈ Rmk×(n+m1+m2), k = 1, 2 we compute
P̃k(t−j ) as in the formulae below
P̃1(t−j ) = (Ad + Bd2F̃2(j))
T P̃1(tj)(Ad + Bd2F̃2(j))
− (Ad + Bd2F̃2(j))T P̃1(tj)Bd1(hR11 + BTd1P̃1(tj)Bd1)
−1




P̃2(t−j ) = (Ad + Bd1F̃1(j))
T P̃2(tj)(Ad + Bd1F̃1(j))
− (Ad + Bd1F̃1(j))T P̃2(tj)Bd2(hR22 + BTd2P̃2(tj)Bd2)
−1
BTd2P̃2(tj)(Ad + Bd1F̃1(j)) + hF̃
T
1 (j)R21F̃1(j). (40)
• In the second step, the computation of the optimal trajectory x̃(t) involves the initial
vector x0 and the equilibrium strategy values uk(j), k = 1, 2.
Then, we illustrate the mean squares of the optimal trajectory E[|x̃(t)|2] and of the
equilibrium strategy E[|ũk(t)|2], k = 1, 2. We set ξ̃(t) = (x̃T(t) ũT1 (t) ũT2 (t))T and
define X(t) = E[ξ̃(t)ξ̃T(t)].
We have t→ X(t) solves the forward linear differential equation with finite jumps:
Ẋ(t) = LX(t), tj ≤ t < tj+1. (41)
For tj = jh we write:
X(t+j ) = (Ad + Bd1F̃1(j) + Bd2F̃2(j)) X(tj) · (Ad + Bd1F̃1(j) + Bd2F̃2(j))
T (42)
0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1, tj = jh, where
LX = AX + XAT + CXCT . (43)
Then, we have used the values to make plots
E[|x̃(iδ + jh)|2] = Tr[X11(iδ + jh)]
E[|ũ1(iδ + jh)|2] = Tr[X22(iδ + jh)]
E[|ũ2(iδ + jh)|2] = Tr[X33(iδ + jh)],
where
X(iδ + jh) =
 X11(iδ + jh) X12(iδ + jh) X13(iδ + jh)XT12(iδ + jh) X22(iδ + jh) X23(iδ + jh)
XT13(iδ + jh) X
T
23(iδ + jh) X33(iδ + jh)

such that X11(iδ + jh) ∈ Rn×n , X22(iδ + jh) ∈ Rm1×m1 and X33(iδ + jh) ∈ Rm2×m2 .
This algorithm enables us to compute the equilibrium strategies values uk(j) of the
players. The experiments illustrate that the optimal strategies are piecewise constant, which
seems to indicate that we have a stabilization effect.
Further, we consider two examples for the LQ differential game described by the
dynamical system (1), the performance criteria (2) and the class of piecewise constant
admissible strategies of type (28).
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Example 1. We consider the controlled system (1) in the special form n = m1 = m2 = 2. The








































































The evolution of the mean square values E[|x̃(t)|]2 and E[|uopt(t)|]2 of the optimal trajectory
x̃(t) (with the initial point xT0 = (0.03 0.01)) and the equilibrium strategies u1,opt(t) and u2,opt(t)
is depicted in Figure 1 on the intervals [0, 1], and in Figure 2 for [0, 2], respectively. The values of
the optimal trajectory x̃(t) equilibrium strategies of both players are very close to zero in both the
short-term and long-term periods.





















-3  Plot the mean square value of the optimal trajectory 

































-3   Plot the optimal controls of both players
Figure 1. (left) E[|x̃(t)|2]; Interval [t0, τ] = [0, 1]; (right) E[|u1,opt(t)|2] and E[|u2,opt(t)|2]; Interval
[t0, τ] = [0, 1].





















-3  Plot the mean square value of the optimal trajectory 

































-3   Plot the optimal controls of both players
Figure 2. (left) E[|x̃(t)|2]; Interval [t0, τ] = [0, 2]; (right) E[|u1,opt(t)|2] and E[|u2,opt(t)|2]; Interval
[t0, τ] = [0, 2].
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Example 2. We consider the controlled system (1) in the special form n = 4 and m1 = m2 = 2.
We define the matrix coefficients A, Bk, C, Dk, Mk, Gk, Rkk, Rk`, k, ` = 1, 2, k 6= ` as follows:
A =

0.5 0.17 0.07 0.9
0.07 0.54 0.2 0.25
0.6 0.8 0.92 0.06










0.07 0.19 0.8 0
0.4 0.18 0.24 0.7
0.06 0.3 0.15 0.4























0.78 0 0 0
0 0.82 0 0
0 0 0.6 0
0 0 0 0.5
 M2 =

0.6 0 0 0
0 0.8 0 0
0 0 0.48 0




0.9 0.05 0.25 0.35
0.05 1 0.2 0.07
0.25 0.2 1.05 0.3
0.35 0.07 0.3 0.9
 G2 =

1.25 0.75 0.21 0.65
0.75 0.88 0.45 0.76
0.21 0.45 1 0.87




1.26 0.25 0.25 0.8
0.25 0.95 0.15 0.4
0.25 0.15 0.96 0.3
0.8 0.4 0.3 0.88
 R22 =

0.6 0.15 0.15 0.4
0.15 0.85 0.36 0.4
0.15 0.36 0.4 0.25




0.98 0.04 0.36 0.4
0.04 0.8 0.36 0.45
0.36 0.36 0.64 0.1
0.4 0.45 0.1 0.89
 R21 =

0.6 0.07 0.35 0.28
0.07 0.8 0.39 0.25
0.35 0.39 1.2 0.48
0.28 0.25 0.48 1.01
.
The evolution of the mean square values E[|x̃(t)|]2 and E[|uopt(t)|]2 of the optimal trajectory
x̃(t) (with the initial point xT0 = (0.15 0.01 0.02 0.03 )) and the equilibrium strategies u1,opt(t)
and u2,opt(t) on the intervals [0, 1] (Figure 3) and [0, 5] (Figure 4), respectively. The values of the
optimal trajectory x̃(t) equilibrium strategies of both players are very close to zero in short-term
and long-term period.
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  Plot the mean square value of the optimal trajectory 
































  Plot the optimal controls of both players
Figure 3. (left) E[|x̃(t)|2]; Interval [t0, τ] = [0, 1]; (right) E[|u1,opt(t)|2] and E[|u2,opt(t)|2]; Interval
[t0, τ] = [0, 1].




















  Plot the mean square value of the optimal trajectory 






























  Plot the optimal controls of both players
Figure 4. (left) E[|x̃(t)|2]; Interval [t0, τ] = [0, 5]; (right) E[|u1,opt(t)|2] and E[|u2,opt(t)|2]; Interval
[t0, τ] = [0, 5].
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have investigated the formulation of existence conditions for the
Nash equilibria strategy in a state feedback form, in the piecewise constant admissible
strategies case. These conditions are expressed through the solvability of the algebraic
Equation (26). The solutions of these equations provide the feedback matrices of the desired
Nash equilibrium strategy. To obtain such conditions for the existence of a sampled-data
Nash equilibrium strategy, we have transformed the original problem into an equivalent
one which requires to find a Nash equilibrium strategy in a state feedback form for a
stochastic differential game, in which the dynamic is described by Itô type differential
equations controlled by impulses. Unlike for the deterministic case, when the problem of
finding of a sampled-data Nash equilibrium strategy can be transformed into an equiv-
alent problem in discrete-time, in the stochastic framework when the controlled system
is described by Itô type differential equations, such a transformation to the discrete-time
case is not possible. The developments from the present work clarify and extend the
results from Section 5 of [23], where only the particular case L = 2 was considered. The
key method used for obtaining the feedback matrices of the Nash equilibrium strategy
via the Equation (26) is the solution P̃k(·), 1 ≤ k ≤ L of the TVP (16). On each interval
(tj−1, tj), 1 ≤ j ≤ N, (16a) consists of L uncoupled backward linear differential equation.
The boundary values P̃k(t−j ) are computed via (16d) for j = N and via (16b) for j ≤ N − 1.
Finally, we gave an algorithm for calculating the equilibrium strategies of the players, and
the numerical experiments suggest a stabilization effect.
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